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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ALICE McJUNKIN, formerly
ALICE RODRIGUEZ, and
MYRNA RODRIGUEZ, a
Minor, by her Guardian, ALICE
McJUNKIN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No. 9150

vs.
HAZEL CHASE,
Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in Appellants' Brief is
relatively complete and contains most of the essential facts shown by the evidence. Although much
of it emphasizes the evidence supporting plaintiffs'
theory of the case, it is in the nature of argument.
We will not repeat all of the facts set forth in Appellants' statement but will point out the areas of
disagreement and direct the attention of the Court
to any additional evidence which we believe necessary for a more complete picture.
1
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Appellants' summary of the pleadings fai1s to
mention that, at the pretrial the court permitted
the defendant to amend her answer to plead assumption of risk.
"Defendant alleges that the plaintiff entered upon the trip with her driver, Vernon
Green, as a joy ride, and that she by reason
of the circumstances assumed the :risk of injury and damage to her person under certain
circumstances which defendant relies on, consisting of the following:
(a) By continuing to ride on the motorcycle when it was being driven at an excessive
rate of speed and in a manner showing that
the driver could not control it or bring it to
a stop in the event of danger;
(b) Also by failing to protest and get
off the vehicle before the accident occurred."
The plaintiff, Myrna Rodriguez, had an opportunity after first getting on the motorcyCle with
Green, to get off at the gas station and thereby
avoid exposing herself to the hazard of riding on it,
which ultimately led to her injury ( R. 213). According to the testimony of Green, the two had
ridden only a couple of short blocks before they
stopped. Green said that between the time they
left Second Avenue and the time they pulled into
the filling station, that Myrna Rodriguez had asked
him to slow down. He testified that when he turned
the motorcycle, it was necessary to lean, and that
on the second corner he turned, he began picking up
2
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speed as he came out of the lean after turning the
corner, and she asked him to slow down. (R. 213)
Mter this first experience, which indicates that
she was frightened, they stopped at the service
station for gas. After leaving the station Myrna
testified tha:t she had not protested the manner in
which Green drove the motorcyc1e or its speed
(T. 206). Her further testimony that Green operated the motorcycle in a careful and prudent manner was disputed by the witness Ahnberg, and was
contrary to the undisputed physical evidence of the
force of the impact.
The contention is made in Appellants' Brief
that the Chase car hit the last half of Green's motorcycle from the engine back. This statement appears
at page 10 of the Appellants' Brief. We contend
that the evidence shows that Green's motorcycle ran
into the extreme left front of the bumper on the
Chase car. That the two photographs, Defendant's
Exhibits 19 and 21, clearly show tha:t the motorcycle ran into the Chase car and that it was not
damaged in the back half, behind the engine, as
claimed by the Appellants. An examination of these
two Exhibits clearly shows tha:t no damage was
done to the exhaust pipe on the right-hand rear
of the motorcycle.
Respondent points out also the difference between photographs introduced on behalf of the plain-
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tiff, Exhibits 5, 6, and 7, and Exhibit 26 introduced
on behalf of the defendant, showing the condition
of weed and foliage existing at the time of the
accident as compared with the condition existing at
the time the plaintiffs' photographs were taken.
It is manifest that the condition existing at the time
this accident occurred would have an adverse effect
on the ability of the driver of each vehicle to see
the other.
The accident happened about 8 :30 P.M. The
view of a westbound motorist south on I Street
from points near the location of the stop sign on
the northeast corner of the intersection was extremely limited. The grade dropped off sudden1y
about 25 feet south of 11th Avenue (T. 144, Exhibit D-26) ; also, the view of a motorist traveling
north on I Street, looking east on 11th Avenue, was
extremely limited because of the hill, weeds growing in the parking, and the foliage of a tree (Exhibit D-27). Apparently recognizing the hazard, the
City had placed a "slow sign" approximately 130
feet south of the south curb of 11th Avenue on the
east side of I Street as a warning to motorists
traveling up the hill on I Street toward the intersection.
The physical facts showed that when the motorcycle struck the defendant's car on the forward
end of the left front bumper (Exhibit 15), the force
·~
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of the in1pact was sufficient to bend the front
bumper assembly on the car to the right (direction
in which the motorcycle was traveling- Exhibits
28, 29, and 30), and propel the plaintiff from the
point of impact in the center of the intersection
in a northwest direction to the parking between
the west curb and the east side of the sidewalk,
near the light pole. (T. 249, 267), a distance of
approximately 50 feet (Exhibit P-1).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE NEGLIGENCE OF GREEN WAS THE SOLE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION AND OF
PLAINTIFF'S INJURY.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE JUSTIFIED THE SUBMISSION
OF INSTRUCTIONS ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE NEGLIGENCE OF GREEN WAS THE SOLE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION AND OF
PLAINTIFF'S INJURY.

Respondent's argument in support of Point I
is supported by the physical facts disclosed by the
record.
First there should be considered the question
of the speed at which Green was traveling at the
time of this impact. The witness who was in the
5
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best position other than Green and the plaintiff,
Myrna Rodriguez, to see the motorcycle and give
an opinion as to its speed, was Carl H. Ahnberg.
He was approximate'ly 50 feet from the intersection of I Street and 11th Avenue, proceeding east
( T. 246). He was asked to estimate the speed of
the motorcycle before it hit the Chase car. His testimony in that regard is as follows, from the Record
(R. 247):
"Q. At that time did you form an estimate as to the speed of the r.aotorcycle before
it hit the car?

"A. Well, I figured between 40 and 50
miles an hour, the way it looked."
Assuming for purposes of argument that Ahnberg was correct in his estimate of the speed of the
vehicle on which the plaintiff, Myrna Rodriguez,
was riding, certainly it was at a rate too fast to
permit the driver to control his vehicle and to avoid
the accident. In this connection, the Court's attention
is again directed to the evidence showing the distance Myrna was hurled through the air by the
force of the collision. The witness Ahnberg testified
(R. 247, 248) that after the impact, she went
through the air something like "superman" to a
point on the parking near the 'light pole on the
northeast corner of the intersection. Even though
the motorcycle struck the automobile a glancing
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blow, the initial impact being on the left front
fender, the force was sufficient to bend the whole
bumper assembly to the right (Exhibits 15, 28,
29, 30).
I Street is a steep slope from 1Oth Avenue to
11th Avenue. The streets are relatively narrow, and
visibility is extremely limited. Certainly, under these
circumstances, it was negligence on the part of
Green to proceed at that speed. It follows that, if
the defendant, Chase, was nat negligent, that the
injury which came to the plaintiff, Myrna Rodriguez, "\Vas solely and proximately caused by the
negligence of Green.
After visiting This Is the Place Monument, defendant was proceeding west on 11th A venue (Trial
1.69). There was a cool breeze at the Monument,
so she had raised the window in the automobile
on her side, which was still up when the accident
happened (Trial 171). When she reached the intersection of 11th Avenue and I Street, she stopped
for the stop sign (Trial 194).
After having stopped, she moved slowly into
the intersection, looking both to the right and to
the left without seeing any approaching vehicle from
either north or south (R. 194). Having ascertained
that it was safe to do so, she proceeded through the
intersection to a point almost at its center, when
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the left front of her car was struck by the motorcycle driven by Green.
The defendant did not hear the sound of the
aproaching motorcycle before the collision. Her first
intimation of the danger was when it suddenly came
into view from her left, over the brow of the hill
and into the intersection (Trial 178) . It was not
sufficiently dark for the motorcycle to display a
beam of light in front of it. At the moment of impact, her car was going slowly. She applied her
brakes and stopped immediately. (Trial 189). The
witness, Mrs. Armstrong, who was driving a car
west behind the vehicle driven by 'the defendant,
heard the sound of the motorcycle but didn't know
the direction from v;hich it was coming. She remembered being stopped on the east side of the
intersection ''with an apprehensive feeling as a fire
engine makes you feel when you hear the noise
that you don't see" (Trial 151). At this time the
defendant's automobile was in the center of the
intersection. What could she have done to avoid
the col'lision, had she heard the sound of the motorcycle and known the direction from which it was
coming? Considering the emergency, she was virtually helpless to avoid the collision.
The section of our Statute which delineates the
rights and obligations of the drivers under circumstances where one travels on an arterial or through
8
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highway and the other on a highway regulated
by stop signs is 41-67 4 Utah Code Annotated 1953,
which is set forth in the Appellant's Brief. For the
purposes of this argument, there is set forth the
language of Subsection (a) of that Section :
"VEHICLE ENTERING A THROUGH
HIGHWAY- The driver of a vehicle shall
stop as required by this act at the entrance
to a through highway and shall yi~ld the
right of way to other vehicles which· have entered the intersection from said through highway or which are approaching so closely on
said through high,Nay as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver, having so
yielded, may proceed; and the drivers of aJll
other vehicles approaching the intersection on
said through highway shall yield the right of
way to the vehicle so proceeding into or across
the through highway." (Italics ours)
Of necessity, this section has ·frequen~ly been
construed by this court relative to the rights and
duties of drivers facing a situation at the scene of
this collision. It is the obvious intention of this section that one stopping for a stop sign need not be
required to remain there forever yielding the right
of way to any vehicles which might be approaching
on the through highway. In the case of Smith v.
Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 P. 893, this Court in construing a Salt Lake City Ordinance modeled after
the foregoing statute, held that after a driver entering a through street had stopped in compliance
with a stop sign, he could then proceed through the
9
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intersection on the assumption that vehicles approaching on a through street would yield the right
of way.
"If the respondent stopped immediately
before entering Highland drive, he complied
with all the requirements of the ordinance.
From that moment he was free to move without restriction, so far as the ordinance is concerned. As he approached Highland drive,
after stopping, the statute gave him the right
of way as against automobiles coming in the
direction the respondent was traveling, and
made it the duty of such persons approaching
from 'the left to yield the right of way."
In Conklin v. Walsh, 19'3 P. 2 437, the opinion
contains the following language, which is certainly
familiar to this Court:
"The duty to keep a proper lookout applies as well to the favored as to the disfavored
driver. Neither driver can excuse his own
failure to observe because the other driver
fai led in his duty. Neither driver is at any
time to be excused for want of vigilance or
failure to see what is plain to be seen. Drivers
are permitted to cross over arterial highways
after having stopped. True, they must yield
the right of way to cars which are close
enough to constitute an immediate hazard.
This rule, however, requires the exercise of
some judgment. There is still a duty on the
part of the driver traveling the arterial highway to remain reasonably alert to the possibility of the disfavored driver starting
across the intersection in the belief that he
can cross in safety. The duty of keeping a
proper lookout attends all those operating mo1

JO
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tor vehic1es, and other rules of the road do ndt
relieve any driver of the necessity of complying with this requirement."
See also Bat,es v. Burns, 3 Utah 2 180,
281 P. 2 209.
The Respondent, therefore, contends that it was
the negligence of Green '\Vhich was the sole, proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff,
Myrna Rodriguez. It is the further contention of the
Respondent that the defendant was not negligent
in any particular, and therefore her conduct could
not have contributed to the injury of the plaintiff.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE JUSTIFIED THE SUBMISSION
OF INSTRUCTIONS ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
We agree w!th the statement from Clay v. Dun-

ford, 121 Ut. 177, 239 P. 2 1075, and Johnson v.
Maynard, 9 Ut. 2 268, 342 P. 2 884, that for the
doctrine of Assumption of Risk to apply, the plaintiff must ndt only know and appreciate the danger
but voluntarily put herself in the way of it. We
submit that the evidence in this case showed that
is exactly what Myrna did. She had been on a motorcycle before (R. 198). From her reside:nce to the
service station was a relatively short ride, during
which she became frightened and requested that
Green not drive so fast. At that time he was driving
about 40 miles per hour (R. 210). When they stopped
11
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at the service station, she had an opportunity to
'leave the motorcycle. Mter they proceeded from the
service station, the plaintiff testified tha;t she made
no protest as to the speed at which Green drove the
motorcycle ( R. 206). She did not ask him how fast
they were going ( R. 207) . In going up the hill she
said that Green was not going fast. Considering the
physical evidence and the testimony of the defendant's witnesses, the jury were not required to believe Myrna's testimony that the motorcycle was
not going fast up the hill, and aparently did not
do so. This was a residential neighborhood; it was
still dusk; the motorcycle could have been stopped
any place along I Street and Myrna dismounted,
had she protested or made any effort to get Green
to stop or even slow down. Her statement to Green
in the presence of the witnesses on the scene after
the accident that she hated him ; that she had told
him not to go so fast, showed an awareness of the
danger. She did not say that she had requested him
to stop and let her off; and according to her, the
only protest she made was before they stopped for
gasoline, not after. The jury was entitled to accept
her statement that she didn't protest after stopping
at the service station and conclude that she should
have done so and made some effort to terminate the
ride, considering the evidence of the motorcycle's
speed as shown by Ahnberg's testimony and the
12
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physical facts. We submit there is a wide divergence
in the facts of this situation and in the facts of
Johnson v. Maynard and Clay v. Dunford, supra.
Liability should not be imposed on the defendant in this case, vvhose conduct has been reviewed
in the argument under this point, when proceeding
lawfully through the intersection, her car was struck
by a motorcycle catapulting into the intersection at
a speed between 40 and 50 miles per hour. There is
no evidence that her conduct was other than that
of a reasonable person under the circumstances.
The case of Maybee v. Maybee, 11 P. 2 973,
discusses the appUcation of assumption of risk to
facts which are analogous to the ones in this case.
In tha:t case a daughter sued her mother for personal injuries received when her mother ran into
a chuckhole in the automobile in which they were
driving, overturning the car, and injuring the plaintiff. The evidence showed that the mother was nearsighted and was driving without her glasses because
they were broken. The daughter knew of the defective condition of her mother's eyesight and was
aware that her mother had been driving for some
time on the day of the accident without her glasses.
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of
action, from which the plaintiff appealed, and the
trial court's action was affirmed by this court. In
13
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the decision, the court had the following to say at
page 975 of 11 P. 2:
"If it was negligence for the defendant
to drive at this speed, ( 45 miles per hour),
with her vision impaired as it was, and without the a:id of glasses, it would fdllow that
where all these facts are fully known to and
appreciated by the plaintiff, and notwithstanding such facts and such knowledge, she
was willing to be driven in the car, she not
only asumed the risk or hazard to her own
safety which resulted from such driving but by
her acquiescense was guilty of independent
negligence which contributed to the accident."
The opinion further employs a quotation from
the earlier case of Atwood v. Railway Company, 140
P. 137. The quotation from that case is as follows:
"It no doubt is the law, as contended by
appellant's counsel, that every occupant of
the vehicle in which he is riding must always
exercise ordinary care for his own safety,
and if by the exercise of such care he could
avoid injury to himself but fails to do so, he
cannot recover, regardless of the fact that he
has no control or direction of the vehicle in
which he was riding at the tin1e of the accident and injury."
In this case the plaintiff, knowingly entrusted
her safety to Green, whose method of operating the
motorcycle had caused her to remonstrate with him
about the speed and caused her to be frightened.
She had an opportunity to avoid riding farther
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with him, which she did not take. The evidence
indicates that he did not slacken speed but was
driving imprudently and at an excessive rate of
speed when the accident happened. The Appe'llant's
Brief is replete with references to her statement
immediately thereafter that she had told him to
slow down.
A more recent Utah case, Esernia v. Overland
Moving Company, 206 P. 2 621, involved an action

by a guest passenger in the Overland Truck for
personal injuries received by him when the truck
overturned. He and his companion were invited to
ride by the Overland driver from Nevada to Salt
Lake City. They were advised when the ride began,
by the driver, that he was tired and sleepy and at
one point before the accident occurred, he had become drowsy and almost run off the road.
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of
the defendants, and this court affirmed the verdict
and judgment. The decision employs the following
language, which we feel is appUcable to the situation here:
"A factor of particular importance is
the extent of the known incompetence or carelessness of the driver or the bad condition of
the car as compared with the disadvantages
of the position in which the plain tiff will be if
he leaves the car. Thus, if the incompetence
of the driver is discovered at a point at which
the plaintiff might obtain other means of
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transportation, or without danger or serious
inconvenience, walk home, or to his destination, it would be contributory negligence to
continue in the car."
We have previously referred to the failure by
the plaintiff to avail herself of the opportunity to
walk home and not continue riding with a motorcyc1e driver whose driving she feared, and thus avoid
injury to herself.
In the case of Wold v. Ogden City, 258 P. 2
453, 12'3 Ut. 270, there is a discussion of the principle of assumption of risk. Justice Henroid uses
the following language in the opinion:
"The doctrine of assumption of risk originally applicable to employer-employee relations, has been extended to some situations
where one knows of a condition and concludes
to accept its attendant hazards and acts accordingly without force of necessity."
The opinion continues with a reference to a
statement by Dean Prosser in his work on Torts,
and says as follows:
"Dean Prosser points up the principle
as it app1ies to the instant case when he asserts that an objective standard must maintain, and that the plaintiff cannot be heard
to say that he did not comprehend a risk which
must have been obvious to him. Further that,
as in the case of negligence, there are certain
risks which any one of adult age must be
taken to appreciate: The danger of slipping on
ice, or falling through unguarded openings."
lfl
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He goes on to say that:
"In the usual case, his knowledge and
appreciation of the danger will be a question
for the jury; but where it is clear tha:t any
person of normal intelligence in his position
must have understood the danger, the issue
must be decided by the court."
Marshall v. Taylor, 8 Ut. 2 29, 32'7 P. 2 262,
decided in 1958, held 'tha:t plaintiffs, who had placed
themselves in a position of peril by holding on to the
handles of the defendant's automobile and then refusing to let go until forced to do so by the increased speed of the automobile, were negligent and
assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law. The
court said:
"We are forced to the conclusion that the
plaintiffs were negligent; and they, in placing themselves in a position of peril, assumed
the risk of injury."
In that case, plain tiffs could not foresee the
exact manner in which they might be injured, but
certainly they could anticipate that injury was probable. So say we here. Myrna's conduct in remaining
on the motorcycle after leaving the service station
justified an assumption of risk and contributory
negligence. Under the evidence, the jury could find
her guilty of one or the other. Further considering
the evidence of defendant's conduct, indicating she
was not negligent as a matter of law, the instructions could not have been prejudicial to the plaintiff.
17
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is the contention of the Respondent that the evidence more than justified the
jury verdict of No Cause of Action. Further, the
Respondent maintains that the evidence would have
justified a directed verdict in favor of the defendant and Respondent and against the plaintiff. In
no event under all the facts and circumstances of
this case, was the plaintiff prejudiced in any way
by the submision of the court's instructions.
In support of this conclusion, we quote the language of the opinion in the recent case of Joseph
v. W. H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital, 348
P. 2 935:
''What the parties are en titled to and the
law seeks to afford is an opportunity for one
chiim'ing a grievance which would justify
legal redress to present it to a court or jury
and have a fair trial. When this is done, and
the verdict and judgment are entered, all presumptions are in favor of their validity. The
burden is upon the appellant not only to show
that there was error but that it was prejudici~l to the extent that there is reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would
have been a different result. We find no such
error here."
The Respondent feels that the Appellant has
ndt sustained the burden which is described in that
quotation, and respectfully submits that the verdict
lR
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and judgment therein in the tria1 court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN
Attorneys for
D,ejendant and Respondent
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